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REASON VERSUS RULE IN LOUISIANA TORT
LAW: DIALOGUES ON HILL V. LUNDIN &
ASSOCIATES, INC.
David W. Robertson*
I.
Everybody knows that under our system of negligence law, there
are times when substandard (negligent) defendants whose behavior
causes harm nevertheless escape liability. Nobody seems to know
quite why, but we are all sure that it happens. If I hand an eight-year-
old child a loaded shotgun; if he takes it home and gives it to his
father; if that night his father gets drunk and kills your prize heifer,
Nick the Greek is giving nine to one that I escape liability to you, even
though:
(1) I was negligent. (It's stupid and dangerous to give loaded
guns to little kids.)
(2) My conduct was a cause of your loss. (If I hadn't produced
the gun, this would not have happened. The father might have
got drunk and killed the heifer with a hatchet, just as he might
have got hold of some other shotgun. But he wouldn't have killed
the heifer, then, there, and thus.)
So why do I escape? The common-sense, visceral response that,
while I was a cause of your loss, somehow I didn't cause it enough,
leads to what for many years has been and in most places remains
the standard answer-my negligence was not a proximate cause of
your loss. I have, repeat, been blameworthy; and my blameworthy
conduct was a cause of your loss-I contributed to the situation,
created the opportunity, put some of the necessary forces in motion,
"set it up." But too much else has intervened-time, space, people,
and bizarreness. This consequence of my negligent behavior, in other
words, was somehow just "too cockeyed and farfetched"' for you to
expect me to pay for it.
The law's negative answer to your action against me-"while the
defendant may have been negligent, his negligent conduct was not a
proximate cause of the plaintiff's loss"-obviously leaves a great deal
unexplained. Why wasn't my conduct a proximate cause? Why need
* Professor of Law, University of Texas.
1. In Palsgraf Revisited, 52 MICH. L. REv. 1, 27 (1953), Dean Prosser attributes
this "test" to a prescient first-year student.
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it have been a proximate cause? What is a proximate cause? Because
the proximate cause formulation appeals to reactions that are ulti-
mately visceral in nature, it is not surprising that the courts have
exhibited no particular temptation to try to get to the bottom of such
questions.' Attempting to explicate the inexplicable is not a charac-
teristic judicial flaw.
Still, the legal realist movement in America spawned a tradition
of relative judicial candor, and modern courts are somewhat sensi-
tive to the unwisdom of intentional mysteriousness. Recently in Hill
v. Lundin & Associates, Inc.' the Louisiana supreme court gave a
strong and convincing demonstration of its determination to work at
unmasking the unnecessarily arcane. No one would have been very
surprised if the case had escaped supreme court review: the facts were
straightforward and rather unspectacular; the outcome below, while
ultimately deemed wrong, was in no important sense unacceptable.
The court's sole reason for deciding the case, as the opinion makes
clear, was pedagogical-the case is a lesson in analytical technique
addressed to the lower courts and the bar.
Celeste Hill, a maid, tripped over a ladder lying in her em-
ployer's yard and hurt herself. Perhaps the defendant, a home repair
contractor, was negligent in having left the ladder leaning against the
house after work was completed. But nobody knew who had later
moved the ladder to the ground, and that, in the court's view, consti-
tuted a new risk, one for which defendant was not responsible. Ad-
2. Proximate cause has always been a troublesome matter, occasionally thereby
provoking judicial expressions of impatience. In Insurance Co. v. Tweed, 74 U.S. (7
Wall.) 44, 52 (1868), the Supreme Court said of proximate cause doctrine (there, as
employed respecting questions of fire insurance coverage): "[W]e have had cited to
us a general review of the doctrine of proximate and remote causes as it has arisen and
been decided in the courts in a great variety of cases. It would be an unprofitable labor
to enter into an examination of these cases. If we could deduce from them the best
possible explanation of the rule, it would remain after all to decide each case largely
upon the special facts belonging to it, and often upon the very nicest discriminations."
See also Mr. Justice Sanders, dissenting in Spiers v. Consolidated Cos., 241 La. 1012,
1027, 132 So. 2d 879, 885 (1961): "[T]he most serious issue posed is whether the
negligence of the defendant was a proximate, or juridical, cause of the harm to plain-
tiff. This question is not free from difficulty. In this state and elsewhere, the subject
of responsible causation is obscured by a smog of empty phrases and verbal intricacies.
It is difficult, if not impossible, to reconcile the decisions that have dealt with it."
(Citations omitted.) For inquiry into the origins of the use of causation doctrines as
liability-limiting devices, see Green, Duties, Risks, Causation Doctrines, 41 TEx. L.
REV. 42 (1962).
3. 260 La. 542, 256 So. 2d 620 (1972).
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dressing itself with some intensity to an issue the lower courts had
barely (if at all)4 seen, the court said:
The basic question . . . is whether the risk of injury from a ladder
lying on the ground, produced by a combination of defendant's
act and that of a third party, is within the scope of protection of
a rule of law which would prohibit leaving a ladder leaning
against the house.
That it was the method of framing such questions-not a particular
answer to this particular question-that provoked the court's interest
in the Hill case is patent. The particular answer here turned out to
be "no," because
the record is devoid of any evidence tending to establish that the
defendant could have reasonably anticipated that a third person
would move the ladder and put it in the position which created
this risk, or that such a 'naked possibility' was an unreasonable
risk of harm.'
That answer, taken alone, is not overly helpful. It invites such subsi-
diary questions as: Why is the risk that someone would move the
ladder a "naked possibility"? What kind of evidence would go to
establish that defendant could reasonably have foreseen that some-
one might move the ladder? Why was it necessary for plaintiff to
establish that particular form of foreseeability; why wasn't it enough
that defendant could have foreseen a more general range of dangers
presented by unattended ladders? Those questions are real and tell-
ing; they lurk beneath the surface explanation of the law's negative
answer to Celeste Hill. But no one could seriously have faulted the
court for foregoing further inquiry.7 With respect to the particular
4. The trial court had held for defendant because it found contributory negligence.
The court of appeal held for plaintiff, in an opinion devoted almost exclusively to the
"momentary forgetfulness" exception to the contributory negligence doctrine. On the
issue that ultimately proved dispositive in the supreme court, the court of appeal said
only: "We find that Lundin & Associates, Inc. was negligent in leaving this ladder on
the job site, unattended, for two or three days after the work had been completed,
where it was foreseeable that someone could be injured by the ladder." Hill v. Lundin
Assoc., Inc., 243 So. 2d 121, 123 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1970).
5. 256 So. 2d at 622.
6. Id. at 623.
7. As much of the literature on the subject-whether it be termed "proximate
cause," "extent of liability," "remoteness of damages," "limitations on liability," or
"scope of liability"-demonstrates, getting at the underlying reasons for a particular
determination is not easy. Prosser, it will be remembered, ultimately throws up his
hands and concludes that about all that can be said is that defendant will pay for fault-
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problem of the Hill case, the quoted answer has perhaps suggested
about all that can sensibly be said: the contractor was (arguendo)
negligent, and as a result Celeste got hurt, but other things had more
to do with her accident than defendant's actions.
II.
But the Louisiana supreme court did offer something more. The
opinion in Hill is quite significant as an indication of the court's
willingness, perhaps even determination, to get further in the nature
of the process of formulating and answering questions of the sort
involved in Hill. As a means of analyzing the clues it gives us, let us
posit an intelligent laymen, not congenitally gullible,9 with an inter-
est in the prevailing mode and level of discourse in our judicial sys-
tem. The court has just stated that Celeste Hill loses, even though
Lundin & Associates' negligent conduct contributed to her injuries.
Brash and faintly irreverent, our layman asks why? There follow two
scenarios. The first is intended to suggest the level of inquiry and
explanation typical of a tribunal employing the standard, proximate
cause approach to the issue presented. The second will be a rather
bold extrapolation from the actual opinion in Hill.
caused harm unless it is "too cockeyed and far-fetched." Prosser, Palsgraf Revisited,
52 MICH. L. REV. 1, 27 (1963). See also Byrd, Proximate Cause in North Carolina Tort
Law, 51 N.C. L. REV. 951 (1973), where the author's only attempts to elicit the underly-
ing reasons are cast in terms of "policy," "basic fairness," and the like; and where the
author, seeking to explain that the courts don't intend proximate cause language to
be taken as seriously as the academic critics believe, states: "Although it is true that
courts sometimes become entangled by causation language, they appear to use it to
describe a result or conclusion concerning liability and not as a statement of basic
principle or as an analytical tool for solution of scope-of-liability problems. The fact
that neither principle nor analysis is disclosed probably reflects simply that the deci-
sion represents a determination reached after all the factors bearing upon the case have
been considered." (Emphasis added.) 51 N.C. L. REV. at 95.
8. "Arguendo," because the supreme court's disposition-that, assuming a duty
not to leave the ladder leaning against the house, breach of that duty did not give rise
to liability because the duty did not embrace the particular risk-pretermits reaching
the question of the substandardness of the conduct in question. As the court stated in
Laird v. Travelers Ins, Co., 263 La. 199, 216, 267 So. 2d 714, 720 (1972): "Actually
neither the combination fact-law question of negligence nor any attendant policy con-
sideration which might deny liability on that basis is reached. The resolution of the
duty-risk element of tort liability adversely to the claimant pretermits an inquiry into
ultimate negligence or fault, for liability cannot be imposed for negligent acts in the
absence of that relationship."
9. This creature, who may not otherwise exist, emerged from 1 STANSBURY'S NORTH
CAROLINA EVIDENCE, 222 (Brandis Rev. 1973), where the author termed some particu-
larly stupid rule of evidence law "a monumental legal asininity, impossible to explain
to any layman not congenitally gullible."
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A.
Court: In order for plaintiff to establish liability for injury pro-
duced through a combination of defendant's act and that of a third
party, it is necessary that she establish that the third party's action
was not an independent intervening variable, insulating the defen-
dant from liability under the doctrine of proximate cause. That is to
say, it mustbe shown that plaintiffs injuries flowed from defendant's
actions through a continuous, direct, unbroken sequence of causa-
tion, undistrubed by the intervention of unforeseeable superseding
factors. We think that in the instant case, the record is entirely de-
void of any evidence going to establish an unbroken chain of causa-
tion. On the contrary, it affirmatively appears from the facts that
plaintiffs injury was proximately produced by the act of a third
person in moving the ladder to the ground, rather than by the act of
defendant in making the ladder accessible to the third person. Ac-
cordingly, we feel that plaintiff has failed to establish the require-
ments of legal and actionable negligence on the part of defendant.
I. (N. C. G.)L: Why is the action of the unknown person who
moved the lader so important? What does it mean to say that per-
son's action was "superseding"?
Court: That person's action, like Lundin's, was a cause of Ce-
leste's injuries-it was necessary for someone to put the ladder on the
ground before she could fall over it. Further, that action happened
later than the contractor's action of leaving the ladder leaning against
the house-that is, it happened after the relevant conduct of Lundin
was finished, over, at rest.10'Thus, in terms of both space and time,
the act of moving the ladder was closer-more proximate-to Ce-
leste's accident than Lundin's action.
I. (N. C. G.)L: Does this mean that it's only the last guy who does
something wrong whom the law regards as responsible for an injury?
Court: Well, no, not always. It depends. Sometimes, the prospect
that someone else will do something, or even do something wrong, will
be the very thing the defendant should have guarded against. For
example, if someone stops a truck on a dark highway at night, with-
out putting out warning flares or devices, there is a strong possibility
that some other driver will run into that truck. He may run into it
because he couldn't see it at all; he may run into it because he wasn't
10. This portion of the court's imaginary proximate cause explanation echoes the
"passive negligence" formula, the doing to death of which was the major business in
Dixie Drive-It-Yourself System v. American Beverage Co., 242 La. 471, 137 So. 2d 298
(1962). See notes 27, 41 and accompanying text infra.
1973]
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paying as close attention to his driving as he should've been." Either
way, the fellow who left the truck on the highway ought to be liable
to an innocent person hurt by that collision. We would probably say
something to the effect that defendant who left the truck on the road
should have foreseen collision with a later inattentive motorist as
likely enough to require him to take precautions against it.
I. (N. C. G.)L: Well, what's really so different about Celeste Hill's
case? Couldn't you say that when the contractor left the ladder lean-
ing against the house, he should have realized that someone might
knock it down and hurt himself or somebody else; that a child might
try to climb it and fall; or that somebody might move it to the ground
(maybe, for all we know, for the very purpose of guarding against
these other dangers) where an innocent person could trip over it?
Court: In the last analysis, these problems are matters of judg-
ment, of degree. This court is charged with the responsibility of
reaching a decision, one way or the other, in some very close and
difficult cases. In our view, somebody's moving the ladder to the
ground just did not seem the kind of thing the defendant should have
been concerned about when he left the ladder leaning against the
house.
I.(N. C. G.)L: But didn't another appellate court come to the op-
posite conclusion?
Court: Yes, but in this case, the court below did not seem to see
the issue of proximate cause with any clarity; it was mainly con-
cerned with another problem in the case." We felt that if the issue
had been properly highlighted for the court below, it would have
agreed with us.
B.
The second scenario is based (rather loosely and presump-
tuously) upon the opinion actually written in the Hill decision. Again,
the concerned layman has been told that Celeste loses, and asks
"why"?
Court: The basic question is whether the risk of injury from a
ladder lying on the ground, produced by a combination of defendant's
act and that of a third party, is within the scope of protection of a
rule of law which would prohibit leaving a ladder leaning against the
house. Foreseeability is not always a reliable guide, and certainly it
is not the only criterion for determination whether there is a duty-
11. These are the essential facts of the Dixie case. See note 10 supra.
12. See note 4 supra.
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risk relationship."3 Where the rule of law upon which a plaintiff relies
for imposing a duty is based upon a statute, the court attempts to
interpret legislative intent as to the risk contemplated by the legal
duty, which is often a resort to the court's own judgment of the scope
of protection intended by the Legislature.'4 Where the rule of law is
13. It is a major contention of this article that the Hill court's major reason for
discrediting "foreseeability" as the main test for the extent of defendant's duty was
the rigidity and aura of automatic application with which it had come to be entrusted.
A closely-related flaw in that term is the confusion that has been imposed on it and
on the law of negligence by the fact that it has been made to serve two distinct
functions: (1) the test of whether defendant has been negligent at all; (2) the extent of
his liability once negligence is established. The use of the same term in approaching
two distinct issues has contributed to difficulty in keeping them separated, a confusion
to which then Judge, now Justice Tate addressed in Bergeron v. Houston-American
Insurance Co., 98 So. 2d 723, 725 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1957), cert. denied, Feb. 10, 1958:
"This non-actionable 'very slight fault' . . . is correctly equated by [appellee] with
that found in 'freak accidents,' where the failure to guard against a remote possibility
of accident, or one which could not in the exercise of ordinary care be foreseen, is held
not to constitute actionable negligence. These cases [relied upon by appellee] all
concern accidents which were not reasonably foreseeable and avoidable by the exercise
of due care, whereas appellee's argument is actually that the disproportionately severe
injuries received by the child . . . were not reasonably foreseeable. We do not believe
these cases to be apposite to the present issue, for in our opinion the accident to the
child . . . was a foreseeable consequence [of appellee's conduct] . . . . although
admittedly the injury received . . . was more serious a consequence of the accident
than might reasonably have been expected." (Citations omitted.) Judge Tate's explan-
ation was lucid: the issue in the cases appellee adduced was negligence vel non, while
the issue in the instant case was the extent of liability once negligence was shown. The
typical use of "foreseeability" as a rubric respecting each issue led to the necessity for
the explanation. For other examples of the difficulty of keeping the two issues sepa-
rated, see Centanni v. New Orleans Public Belt R.R., 261 So. 2d 729, 731 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1972) (Hill cited on issue of negligence for proposition, "It is only that conduct
which creates an appreciable range of risk for causing harm that is prohibited."). See
also Jones v. Robbins, 275 So. 2d 812 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1973); Vander v. New York
Fire & Marine Und., Inc., 192 So. 2d 635, 640-41 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1966) (concurring
opinion).
In short, "foreseeability" as a test for the extent of a negligent defendant's liability
has been a mess. In addition to the sort of confusion noted above, it seems to have
had the power to make into difficult issues questions of liability that would on their
face seem relatively straightforward. In the following cases, the Louisiana supreme
court eventually held for plaintiff, but only after some travail: Jackson v. Jones, 224
La. 403, 69 So. 2d 729 (1953) (unattended lumber with protruding nails hurt child on
school ground); Lasyone v. Zenoria Lbr. Co., 163 La. 185, 111 So. 670 (1927) (three-
inch nail protruding from tenant-house wall punctured skull of tenant's seventeen-
month-old daughter); Davis v. Hochfelder, 153 La. 183, 95 So. 598 (1923) (mother cut
herself breaking into bathroom to rescue son asphyxiated by faulty heater); Payne v.
Georgetown Lbr. Co., 117 La. 983, 42 So. 475 (1906) (sawmill worker killed when
watchman threw shovel, hitting carriage lever).
14. For forthright recognition that the process of determining the ambit of protec-
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jurisprudential and the court is without the aid of legislative intent,
the process of determining the risk encompassed within the rule of
law is neverthelesss similar. The same policy considerations which
would motivate a legislative body to impose duties to protect from
certain risks are applied by the court in making its determination.
This defendant's alleged misconduct, its alleged breach of duty, was
in leaving the ladder leaning against the house unattended. The risk
encountered by the plaintiff which caused her harm was the ladder
lying on the ground where it was placed by another. The record is
devoid of any evidence tending to establish that the defendant could
have reasonably anticipated that a third person would move the lad-
der and put it in the position which created this risk, or that such a
"naked possibility" was an unreasonable risk of harm.'5
I. (N. C. G.)L: What does it mean to ask whether the defendant
could reasonably have anticipated that a third person would move
the ladder? What kinds of evidence that he could have anticipated
it might Celeste Hill have presented?
Court: Perhaps the reference to the defendant's reasonable antic-
ipations is misleading you. As we said in the case,
[floreseeability is not always a reliable guide. . . . Just because
a risk may foreseeably arise by reason of conduct, it is not neces-
sarily within the scope of the duty owed because of that conduct.
Neither are all risks excluded from the scope of duty simply be-
cause they are unforeseeable. The ease of association of the injury
with the rule relied upon, however, is always a proper in-
quiry. . . . 'All rules of conduct irrespective of whether they are
the product of a legislature or are a part of the fabric of the court-
made law of negligence, exist for purposes. They are designed to
protect some persons under some circumstances against some
risks. Seldom does a rule protect every victim against every risk
that may befall him. . . . The task of defining the proper reach
or thrust of a rule in its policy aspects is one that must be under-
taken by the court in each case as it arises. How appropriate is
the rule to the facts of this controversy? This is a question that
the courts cannot escape." This defendant's alleged . . . breach
tion of a statute is creative business, see Hartman v. Allstate Ins. Co., 271 So. 2d 372
(La. App. 4th Cir. 1972); Jackson v. Beechwood, Inc., 180 So. 2d 732 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1965).
15. The hypothetical court's explanation consists of selected quotes from the Hill
opinion, 260 La. 542, 550-51, 256 So. 2d 620, 622-23.
16. The court was quoting Malone, Ruminations on Cause-in-Fact, 9 STAN. L.
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of duty was in leaving the ladder leaning against the house unat-
tended. The risk encountered by the plaintiff. . . was the ladder
lying on the ground where it was placed by another . . . .The
record is devoid of any evidence tending to establish that the
defendant could have reasonably anticipated that a third person
would move the ladder and put it in the position which created
this risk. . . .A rule of law which would impose a duty upon one
not to leave a ladder standing against a house does not encompass
the risk here encountered."
I. (N. C. G.)L: Pardon me, but, to me, "anticipate" and "foresee"
mean much the same thing. It sounded as if you said foreseeability
is not the test, but then later said this victim loses essentially because
the way she was hurt was not foreseeable.
Court: You are overlooking our repeated reference to the policy
inquiry of the ease of associating the injury with the rule violated.
What we are saying is something like this: If we created a rule saying,
"don't leave ladders leaning against houses after work is through,"
we would have in mind a range of dangers involving the ladder as an
invitation to climb, and probably as well a range of dangers involving
the propensity of leaning ladders to fall. But we don't think we'd have
been particularly concerned about the danger that someone might lay
the ladder on the ground where someone else might trip over it.
I.(N.C.G.)L: You did say, though, that there was no evidence
that defendant could reasonably have anticipated that a third person
would move the ladder and put it in the position which created this
risk. Does that really mean, then, there's no evidence that the creator
of a rule against leaving ladders leaning would have been worried
about the prospect of someone's laying it on the ground? What kind
of evidence would show that?
Court: The inquiry into the ease of association of the injury with
the rule violated is not unrelated to the question of what the particu-
lar defendant should have anticipated. If, for example, there had
been evidence tending to show that defendant knew or should have
known that the home where Celeste Hill worked as a maid was a
continually chaotic place, with window washers, gardeners, painters,
carpenters, cooks, chickens, and dogs forever coming and going; with
ancient invalids roaming the grounds; with tiny children in great
numbers always tearing about, we might have felt that a rule of
REv. 60, 73 (1956), an article that ought to be consulted by everyone as an example of
what law review articles are supposed to be but seldom are.
17. 260 La. 542, 551, 256 So. 2d 620, 622-23.
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negligence law required that dangerous things like ladders not be left
lying or leaning about such a place, at all. In that case, Celeste's
injuries would be much easier to associate with the rule violated by
defendant.
I.(N.C.G.)L: That does seem to make sense. But why isn't it
always just as good to say that, if and only if defendant should under
the circumstances have foreseen something like this happening, then
he is liable for it?
Court: That formulation would often do nicely. But it is some-
times true that a defendant who has been substandard because his
conduct created a number of foreseeable dangers is held liable for the
occurrence of some other danger created by that same conduct, even
though he couldn't have foreseen that.
L (N. C. G.)L: Oh, I remember your saying at the beginning that
"just because a risk may foreseeably arise by reason of conduct, it is
not necessarily within the scope of the duty owed because of that
conduct. Neither are all risks excluded from the scope of duty simply
because they are unforeseeable."'' 8 When is it, then, that a defendant
who couldn't have foreseen a particular danger is nevertheless respon-
sible for it?
Court: When we said that, we had a couple of instances in mind.
In one case, 9 the defendant was driving a heavy truck pretty reck-
lessly. He ran into the rear of a parked truck; it exploded; some
overhead power lines were severed, and one of them fell on a lady who
came out of her house 100 to 150 feet away to see what was happening.
The court quite correctly held defendant liable, even though perhaps
nobody would have anticipated the particular injury to plaintiff. He
was, after all, very negligent; the entire series of events happened
quickly and dramatically, and, as the court said, "the [specific]
consequences of negligence are almost invariably surprises."20
In the other case,' defendant negligently left his truck on a dark
18. 260 La. at 550, 256 So. 2d at 622.
19. This is Chavers v. A.R. Blossman, Inc., 45 So. 2d 398 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1950).
20. Id. at 402. The court was quoting WHARTON, LAW OF NEGLIGENCE, § 77 (2d
ed.). The Louisiana courts have not infrequently resorted to that particular quotation,
usually in circumstances indicative of judicial doubt about the wisdom of a particular
extension of liability. See, e.g., Atkins v. Bush, 141 La. 180, 74 So. 897 (1917) (defen-
dant liable for condition of barbed wire fence which cut off foot of plaintiff riding by
on wagon on public road; the Court thought the accident "an extraordinary one" but
comforted itself with the Wharton quotation.); Payne v. Georgetown Lbr. Co., 117 La.
983, 42 So. 475 (1906) (sawmill worker killed when watchman threw shovel, hitting
saw-carriage lever).
21. This is Lynch v. Fisher, 34 So. 2d 513 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1947) (nonsuit mo-
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highway, unmarked. Some people ran into it; they were hurt and
trapped in their car, which eventually caught fire. Plaintiff, who lived
nearby, came over to help. While helping the injured lady out of her
car, he found a pistol and handed it to the dazed husband, who shot
plaintiff in the ankle. The court held that defendant, who'd left the
truck in the road, was liable to the rescuer, despite the fact that
nobody would have predicted that anything exactly like this would
happen, essentially because the defendant was quite negligent, plain-
tiff was a decent, heroic volunteer, and the husband who did the
actual shooting was not in control of his faculties at the time.
I. (N. C. G.)L: I can sort of sense why those two cases are, in a way,
different from Celeste Hill's case-different enough to justify their
coming out differently. But it is very hard for me to explain that
difference to myself in words.
Maybe it would help to approach it from the other direction. I
believe you also said that just because a risk is foreseeable, it is not
necessarily within the defendant's duty. When would a defendant
who could and should have foreseen the thing that happened never-
theless escape responsibility for it?
Court: In the case we had centrally in mind when we made that
statement," plaintiff's husband and father were killed by a dangerous
lunatic whom defendant M.D. had that very day released from a
facility for the insane, despite his strong suspicions about the luna-
tic's dangerousness. Notwithstanding the evident foreseeability of the
tragedy, the court found that defendant was not liable. As you sug-
gest is frequently true in this area of law, the reason is a bit difficult
to articulate. About all the court said was that the statutes setting
up the duties of the defendant made his decisions respecting the
release of inmates completely discretionary. Really, one would ulti-
mately just have to say the case involved special problems of an
institutional nature, no pun intended.
I.(N.C.G.)L: I think I am beginning to understand something.
You said in the opinion in the Hill case that "the same policy consid-
erations which would motivate a legislative body to protect from
certain risks are applied by the court."2 You also said that "the task
of defining the proper reach or thrust of a rule in its policy aspects is
one that must be undertaken by the court in each case as it arises.
24
tions), 41 So. 2d 692 (merits) (La. App. 2d Cir. 1949). The two opinions in the case
are virtually identical.
22. Cappel v. Pierson, 132 So. 391 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1931).
23. 256 So. 2d at 623.
24. Id. The "policy aspects" statement was quoted from Malone, Ruminations on
Cause-in-Fact, 9 STAN. L. REV. 60, 73 (1956).
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That means that each case that comes up has to be looked at to see
if this defendant ought to be liable?
Court: That is somewhat overstated, but it is essentially correct.
In the last analysis, we are charged with the responsibility of reaching
a result which is fair, just, and even-handed under all the relevant
circumstances.
I.(N.C.G.)L: "Fair, just, and even-handed"-that's the kind of
thing you meant by the terms "policy considerations" and "policy
aspects" in the Hill opinion?
Court: Partly. The courts are always intensely concerned with
being fair to the particular parties in the case at hand. But "policy"
is a word that also evokes other obligations of the courts:
-to decide in accordance with precedent, when there is relevant
precedent, or to explain carefully why not;
-to avoid reaching decisions that create or imply the existence
of a principle that would be difficult or impossible to apply sensi-
bly and fairly in the future;
-to consider whether the general application of the kind of result
reached in a particular case would amount to an unnecessary,
undesirable, or unfair economic or social burden on some class of
businesses or individuals. 5
I.(N.C.G.)L: But none of those "policy considerations" are
talked about in the Hill case, nor, from what you tell me, in these
other cases presenting the same general kind of problem. Why is
that?
Court: Maybe it is just a matter of tradition. Courts don't talk
that way, it's just not done. But, really, you must realize that often
there's not very much sensibly to be said about the ultimate reason
for a particular result-that it just seems more fair than the opposite
outcome may be about all there is to it.
I. (N. C. G.)L: Then why write opinions at all? What, for example,
was really accomplished by the opinion in the Hill case?
Court: You are getting pretty far afield in asking about judicial
opinions generally. There are all sorts of reasons, some of them deeply
connected with the importance of ritual in any society, supporting the
general practice of opinion writing.2"
25. The considerations my imaginary court has just articulated are taken from
Leon Green's frequently iterated explanations for the outcome of duty decisions-his
moral, historical, administrative, and economic factors. See, e.g., Green, The Duty
Problem in Negligence Cases, 28 COLUM. L. REV. 1014, 1034 (1928).
26. I do not intend to evoke anything as over-statedly cynical as the following from
Jerome Frank. Indeed, a basic tacit premise here is that judicial opinions can and
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But with respect to the Hill case itself, it is easy to answer you.
Lawyers and courts are very busy; they have a lot to do, and usually
seem to have to do it quickly. For that reason and others, there is an
incredibly strong tendency to need, and therefore to create, cut-and-
dried rules for certain kinds of cases. Sometimes that works, but often
the rule is too specific and rigid to be really workable. For example,
the Louisiana courts routinely used to say that any time defendant's
negligence had become passive, had come to rest, before something
else of an active nature hurt the plaintiff, defendant was not liable.
Of course, such a "rule" overlooks hard questions such as how you
tell when someone's negligence has become passive. And even if you
could tell, sometimes it would be unfair to apply the rule. Eventually
we had to do away with that cut-and-dried idea. We had to tell the
lower courts there's nothing magic about the idea of "passive negli-
gence"; that the "passive negligence" formulation may be a useful
way of putting the question, but that, to answer it, there's no substi-
tute for sensitive and informed judgment in the particular case."
The same kind of worry led us to write the Hill opinion the way
we did. It seemed to us that the lower courts had been taking ideas
like "foreseeability" and "proximate cause" and attempting to make
magic, cut-and-dried, automatic problem-solving devices out of
them. Something almost like a computer model was evolving: plug
in the facts; if the label "foreseeable" kicks out of the computer,
plaintiff wins; if not, not. What we were telling the lower courts in
the Hill opinion was this: Look, not many of the possible statements
of doctrine of the negligence law are rules, in the sense of inexorable
or automatic application. Certainly there are no rules for these diffi-
cult problems of the extent of defendant's duty. What negligence
doctrine does for you in these cases is provide an efficient and clear
way of stating and seeing the problem. But, in the last analysis, the
answer to the issue is a human, not a computer, judgment.
should explain. See Frank, What Courts Do In Fact, 26 ILL. L. REV. 645, 653 (1932):
"The judge's opinion makes it appear as if the decision were a result solely of playing
the game of law-in-discourse. But this explanation is often truncated, incomplete.
Worse, it is frequently unreal, artificial, distorted. It is in large measure an after-
thought. It omits all mention of many of the factors which induced the judge to decide
the case. . . . Opinions, then, disclose but little of how judges come to their conclu-
sions. The opinions are often ex post facto; they are censored expositions. To study
those eviscerated expositions as the principal bases of forecasts of future judicial action
is to delude oneself."
27. In my view, the imaginary court has just stated the most important aspect of
the decision in Dixie Drive-It- Yourself System v. American Beverage Co., 242 La. 471,
137 So. 2d 298 (1962). See note 10 and accompanying text supra and notes 33, 41 and
accompanying text infra.
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I. (N.C. G.)L: That's very exciting! What you've said is that the
law offers a formula for carefully analyzing these problems, but that
it is a mistake to think that it offers automatic or easy answers?
Court: Yes. The point is that "foreseeability" and "proximate
cause," like "passive negligence," are not useful formulae for analy-
sis. On the contrary, all these phrases seem to be prone to treatment
as rules, rather than as analytical guides to principled decision. The
Hill decision commends a formula that makes it clear what the court
is really charged with doing in each case: determining, via the same
kinds of policy considerations which would motivate a legislative
body to impose duties to protect from certain risks, whether there is
a duty-risk relationship in the case at hand.
III.
When I began studying torts in the late fifties, I was convinced
by Wex Malone (in person and in print) and Leon Green (in print)
that problems of the general sort presented by the Hill case were
better approached-more clearly, more efficiently, and, in a sense,
more honestly-through inquiry into the ambit of defendant's duty 8
than via any of the multiplicity of causation doctrines traditionally
used to limit liability. In the ensuing years spent studying and teach-
ing torts, nothing has happened to dispel that conviction. The rela-
tive advantages of the duty formulation are myriad and formidable:
(1) As a theory designed to account for and predict judicial outcomes,
it is clearer and infinitely more cogent. 9 (2) As a vehicle for suggest-
28. Perhaps because "proximate cause" or "legal cause" has been the more tradi-
tional approach to the issue of the ambit of liability of a negligent defendant, the courts
sometimes exhibit a tendency to see the scope-of-duty approach as somehow magical
and mysterious. (See, e.g., Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Cullen, 235 So. 2d 154, 159 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1970) (dissenting opinion): "[Tihe 'duty' approach is not significant in view
of the fact that this is a question of contributory negligence and the duty approach is
not applicable in such situations.") But there is nothing strange or peculiar about it;
it is simply an alternative, shorter-and-clearer way of putting the basic issue of the
ambit of responsibility of a negligent actor. "Proximate cause" formulations can be
translated into "duty" formulations, and vice versa; see the beginning statement of
each of the two scenarios, supra, text following notes 9 and 12.
29. "Proximate cause" doctrines can become wonderfully intricate; their rococo
elaborations are especially impressive for a vehicle offering so little in the way of
meaningful explanation. See, e.g., Brody v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 438 F.2d
1148 (5th Cir. 1971), treating and ultimately approving a fairly ponderous proximate
cause jury instruction given by an exceptionally able trial judge in the case treating
Jayne Mansfield's fatal accident. See also Moses v. Central Louisiana Electric Co., 324
F.2d 69 (5th Cir. 1963), for an intricate and troubled proximate cause charge which
was disapproved as misleading by the appellate court. These proximate cause doc-
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ing the inevitability of human choice, it is far more honest. (3) As a
means of indicating the range of policy factors that should be consid-
ered in reaching judgments of the sort in question, it is more evoca-
tive. ("Evocative," because it is rare that the duty formulation will
lead to very extensive discussion of the underlying policy factors; but
at least the importance of "policy" gets mentioned.) (4) In its func-
tion of allocating the respective decision-making powers and respon-
sibilities of judge and jury, it makes more sense.'"
Still, I was slightly puzzled by the magnitude of the enthusiasm
with which both my mentors greeted the Hill decision. My problem,
as I put it to Professor Malone, was essentially this: Suppose we agree
that there's not much a judge in a case like Hill ean or should say
beyond making it clear that the law as a matter of policy has elected
to draw the line of protection short of the instant risk. Then what's
so wonderfully more elucidating about the vocabulary of duty than
the jargon of proximate cause? Neither type of formulation offers
much in the way of a real-world reason for the conclusion being
reached. True, the duty analysis is all but invariably more elegant,
cleaner, more concise than proximate cause talk. True, the duty for-
mulation makes it somewhat clearer that the law is making a rather
arbitrary policy choice. (Maybe proximate cause language does try to
sound as though there's some firm doctrinal basis for the decision.)
But the two formulations are rather easily translatable, one into the
other. Each is rather easily seen to be ultimately the articulation of
a conclusion, rather than an explanation of its grounds. So, aside
from aesthetics, what real difference does it make?
Since posing that rather lengthy question, I have attempted fur-
ther study of the problem. The obvious starting point was Dixie
Drive-It-Yourself System v. American Beverage Co.3 There, the
Louisiana supreme court, concerned to defuse and de-rigidify a "pas-
trines are not less intricate when employed as a vehicle for appellate court articulation.
See Hoover v. Wagner, 189 So. 2d 20, 27 (La. App. 1st Cir.), cert. denied, 249 La. 735,
190 So. 2d 241 (1966). "It is .. . the firmly entrenched law of this state that to
constitute proximate cause as distinguished from remote cause, the negligent act must
be the primary or moving cause of the injury, or that cause which, in a natural and
continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury
and without which the accident could not have happened, provided the injury is of a
nature reasonably anticipatable or foreseeable as a natural consequence of the wrong-
ful act." See also Peats v. Martin, 133 So. 2d 920 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1961).
30. In this article the focus is on the use of the duty formulation in articulating
appellate judgments; the important judge-jury question is not being considered. That
question, of course, was crucial to the evolution of the theory. See L. GREEN, JUDGE
AND JURY (1930); L. GREEN, RATIONALE OF PROXIMATE CAUSE (1927).
31. 242 La. 471, 137 So. 2d 298 (1962).
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sive negligence" formula, 2 for the first time clearly prescribed33 that
problems of the extent of liability of a violator of a relevant statute
be approached in terms of "whether the risk and harm encountered
by the plaintiff fall within the scope of protection of the statute."34
The importance of the Dixie decision has been well recognized;35 it
changed the thinking of the Louisiana courts respecting the appropri-
ate range of inquiry in statutory negligence cases,3" and has had dra-
matic effect in cases involving breach of case law duties as well. 37
32. See notes 10, 27 and accompanying text supra and note 41 and accompanying
text infra.
33. Dixie is not the first case employing the ambit of protection approach to
problems of statutory negligence. See, e.g., Lopes v. Sahuque, 114 La. 1004, 38 So. 810
(1904). However, prior to Dixie resort to that approach was somewhat random, and
there had been no such clear and complete articulation.
34. 242 La. at 487, 137 So. 2d at 304.
35. For a thorough study, see Malone, Ruminations on Dixie Drive-It-Yourself
Versus American Beverage Company, 30 LA. L. REv. 363 (1970).
36. See Harkins v. State, Dept. of Highways, 247 So. 2d 644 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1971) (statutes requiring highway signs and warnings protected this plaintiff against
this type of risk); Todd v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 219 So. 2d 538 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1969) (duty not to run into parked car did not protect owner in nearby house against
the threat of extreme mental distress producing bodily harm); but see Speight v.
Southern Farm Bur. Ins. Co., 254 So. 2d 485 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1971); Williams v.
Travelers Ind. Co., 210 So. 2d 58, 59 (La. App. 1st Cir.), cert. denied, 252 La. 479, 211
So. 2d 335 (1968) ("[P]laintiffs failed to perform any of the duties prescribed for them
by the statute. The accident which resulted was the kind which the law was designed
to prevent."); Barilleaux v. George D. Mattix, Inc., 202 So. 2d 461 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1967) (statute imposing strict liability on erector of scaffold did not protect plaintiff,
employee of another contractor, who borrowed scaffold without authorization and
altered it before attempting use). See also Casagrande v. Roullier, 267 So. 2d 260 (La.
App. 4th Cir. 1972); Sevin v. Diamond M. Drill. Co., 261 So. 2d 375 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1972); L'Hoste v. Ciravola, 261 So. 2d 238 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1972); Payne v. Allstate
Ins. Co., 256 So. 2d 788 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 260 La. 1123, 258 So. 2d
376 (1972); Gautreaux v. Pierre, 254 So. 2d 476 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1971); Broussard v.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 188 So. 2d 111 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1966); Westchester
Fire Ins. Co. v. Dardar, 158 So. 2d 239 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1963); Moses v. Mosley, 146
So. 2d 263 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962).
37. See Craig v. Burch, 228 So. 2d 723, 730 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1969), where,
reversing the trial court, the court of appeal after extended and careful analysis held
negligent seller of recapped tire liable to victims of automobile accident. "The term
proximate cause must be used with caution because it does not concern an inquiry into
cause. Rather, it involves an inquiry into duty, more particularly, the extent of defen-
dant's duty with respect to plaintiff's interest to be protected." See also Illinois Cent.
R.R. v. Braswell Indus., Inc., 227 F. Supp. 347 (W.D. La. 1964); Murphy v. Central
La. Elec. Co., 261 So. 2d 694 (La. App. 3d Cir.), cert. denied, 262 La. 302, 263 So. 2d
44 (1972); Ates v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 191 So. 2d 332 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1966); Fontenot v. Fidelity Gen. Ins. Co., 185 So. 2d 896 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1966); Dartez
v. City of Sulphur, 179 So. 2d 482 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1965); Audubon Ins. Co. v.
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Still, of the more than 130 decisions ostensibly relying on the Dixie
case, most continue to employ causation language to refer to issues
other than cause-in-fact,3 1 occasionally to the complete detriment of
National Sur. Corp., 150 So. 2d 612 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1963); Bertrand v. Trunkline
Gas Co., 149 So. 2d 152 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1963); Lamed v. Wallace, 146 So. 2d 434
(La. App. 3d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, January 25, 1963; Norton v. Argonaut Ins. Co.,
144 So. 2d 249 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1962).
38. According to Professor Malone in Ruminations on Dixie Drive-It-Yourself Ver-
sus American Beverage Company, 30 LA. L. REV. 363, 373 (1970), "the influence of the
Dixie opinion in prompting courts of appeal to regard causation within its proper and
modest perspective as a factual matter to be determined according to the probabilities
has been great." However, to complete the picture one would have to add, "but not
great enough." For example, the courts of appeal seem fairly routinely to say that the
negligence of one party was the "sole cause," or the "sole proximate cause," or the
"sole and proximate cause" of an accident when what they apparently mean is either
that the other party was not negligent, or that the other party's negligent conduct did
not breach a duty extending to the particular risk. As Professors Green and Smith
stated in Negligence Law, No-Fault, and Jury Trial-I., 50 TEx. L. REv. 1093, 1117
(1972): "Many, perhaps most, courts use 'proximate cause' to mean causal connection,
but the usage is frequently ambiguous. The courts that reject 'foreseeability' as a
requisite of proximate cause apparently are thinking of it as the causal connection
between the defendant's conduct and the plaintiff's injury. This, however, is not al-
ways true, because proximate cause is also used as a substitute for other issues in a
negligence case." In none of the Louisiana cases referred to is it believed that causal
connection was the issue; in each of them, the terminology of causation referred either
to the want of negligence or the want of duty on the part of another party to the
accident. See McDonald v. Osborne, 279 So. 2d 263 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1973); Bailes v.
Casualty Recip. Exch., 279 So. 2d 255 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1973); Reliance Ins. Co. v.
Dickens, 279 So. 2d 234 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1973); Griffin v. Stephany, 279 So. 2d 232
.(La. App. 4th Cir. 1973); Clements v. Continental Ins. Co., 277 So. 2d 714 (La. App.
2d Cir. 1973); Poret v. Spencer, 277 So. 2d 689 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1973); Hale v. Aetna
Cas. & Sur. Co., 273 So. 2d 860 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1973); Moore v. Concrete Pipe Prod.,
Inc., 263 So. 2d 481 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1972); Riels v. Howell, 243 So. 2d 280 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1971); Smith v. Frederick, 221 So. 2d 306 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1969); American
Fid. Fire Ins. Co. v. Tyler, 210 So. 2d 561 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1968); Wascom v. Varnado,
209 So. 2d 72 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1968); Muse v. W.H. Patterson & Co., 182 So. 2d 665
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1965); Kinchen v. Cottle, 173 So. 2d 379 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1965);
Barilleaux v. Noble Drill. Corp., 160 So. 2d 319 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1964); Foreman v.
American Auto. Ins. Co., 137 So. 2d 728 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962).
The use of causation language when something else is meant can produce serious
confusion. It is particularly likely to do so when it provokes statements to the effect
that, because A caused it, B didn't, as in Beraud v. Allstate Ins. Co., 251 So. 2d 402,
403 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1971): "There is little doubt that the plaintiff violated ... the
statutory prohibition against passing in a no-passing zone. . . .[But] the fact that
plaintiff found herself opposite the 'yellow line' or in a no-passing zone at the time the
accident occurred does not require here our finding that such conduct amounted to
negligence. Mrs. Beraud had commenced her passing manuever and could have done
so in perfect safety as the way was clear of oncoming traffic. Except for the defendant's
having negligently made a left turn in front of Mrs. Beraud at a time when he should
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have observed her in the act of passing him, there would have been no accident. In
other words, the conduct of the plaintiff in violating the statute prohibiting passing
was not a cause-in-fact of the accident." Of course, once it's realized that there can
be more than one cause-in-fact of an accident, it's perfectly plain that both plaintiff's
conduct and defendant's conduct were causative here. The court did have a genuine
reason for exonerating plaintiff, cast in terms of the scope of protection of the statute
plaintiff violated. But the statement that, because defendant caused it, plaintiff didn't
is clearly wrong. See in this connection the discussion of Brantley v. Brown, 277 So.
2d 141 (La. 1973), note 47 infra.
Somewhat less disturbingly, but occasionally still confusingly, there is an easy
tendency in much of the jurisprudence to equate, explicitly or implicitly, the concepts
of "proximate cause" and "cause in fact." See Brenham v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 F.
Supp. 119 n.123 (W.D. La. 1971); Rossiter v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 255 So. 2d 103
(La. App. 2d Cir. 1971); Walker v. Milton, 253 So. 2d 566 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1971),
aff'd on other grounds, 263 La. 555, 268 So. 2d 654 (1972); Stutts v. Sistrunk, 245 So.
2d 721 (La. App. 3d Cir.), cert. denied, 258 La. 764, 247 So. 2d 395 (1971); Nichols v.
Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 240 So. 2d 568 (La. App. 2d Cir.), cert. denied, 256 La. 1144,
241 So. 2d 251 (1970); McCauley v. LaFleur, 213 So. 2d 176 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1968);
Hall v. State, Dept. of Highways, 213 So. 2d 169 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1968); American
Fid. Fire Ins. Co. v. Tyler, 210 So. 2d 561 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1968); Landry v. Yarbrough,
199 So. 2d 377 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1967); Jones v. Maryland Cas. Co., 179 So. 2d 678
(La. App. 2d Cir. 1965); Lee v. Carwile, 168 So. 2d 469 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1964). Even
the supreme court occasionally succumbs to the tendency, see Parnell v. Connecticut
Fire Ins. Co., 245 La. 16, 156 So. 2d 462 (1963).
As suggested, the equation of "proximate cause" and "cause in fact" does not very
often distort outcome, but it does produce confusion and frequently means that the
reader is unable to determine what, precisely, the theory of a particular resolution was.
See Hinegardner v. Dickey's Potato Chip Co., 205 So. 2d 157, 161 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1967); defendant's action in blocking view at corner "too remote to figure actively or
proximately in the conduct of [the two drivers]. Its negligence formed no part of the
chain of caustion and was not a cause-in-fact. See Dixie . . . .We quote approvingly
from 65 C.J.S. Negligence . . .in its discussion of proximate cause .... " The result
reached was sustainable under one of two theories: (1) the accident would have hap-
pened even had the view been unobstructed; (2) defendant's duty did not embrace the
risk of collision between two vehicles as negligent as those here involved. The point
about the court's approach-indeed, the distinctive feature of equating "proximate
cause" and "cause in fact"-is that one can't tell which resolution was achieved. There
was similar confusion in O'Connor v. St. Louis Fire & Mar. Ins. Co., 217 So. 2d 750,
753 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1961); the court said that the action of child plaintiff in entering
traffic, rather than the double-parking of Pepsi truck, was the "sole factor which
brought about the injury." It then said, "framing this another way, it is our opinion
that the injury which was suffered by the young child was not one which the statute
was contemplated to protect. Had the truck been legally parked next to the curb the
result to the young child would have been the same had she run out from in front of it
into the street into the path of the approaching taxi." This merger of causation and
duty doctrines leaves the reader at sea as to what the basis for decision was.
Finally, there are a number of indications that the courts sometimes see "cause-
in-fact" as the only limitation Dixie suggests on the extent of coverage of a relevant
duty, when, in reality, it is only the threshold inquiry; the operative limitation Dixie
stresses is the policy inquiry into the coverage of the duty. See, e.g., Coleman v. Van
Dyke, 277 So. 2d 709 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1973); Communication Serv. of La., Inc., v.
Smith, 250 So. 2d 414 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1971); Beaugh v. Broussard, 199 So. 2d 386
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clarity of analysis" and correctness of outcome. 0 Further, even the
rather clearcut admonition against automatic employment of the
"passive negligence" notion has sometimes been ignored.4" All in all,
the picture that emerges is that the courts of appeal have been willing
(La. App. 3d Cir. 1967); Johnson v. Johnson, 171 So. 2d 710 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1965);
Call v. Huffman, 163 So. 2d 397 (La. App. 2d Cir.), cert. denied, 246 La. 376, 164 So.
2d 361 (1964); Bodan v. American Employers Ins. Co., 160 So. 2d 410, (La. App. 2d
Cir. 1964); Bertrand v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 160 So. 2d 19 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1964);
evert v. Travelers Ind. Co., 140 So. 2d 811 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962).
39. See, e.g., Miller Car Washes Inc. v. Crowe, 245 So. 2d 485 (La. App. 2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 258 La. 762, 247 So. 2d 862 (1971). Plaintiff's automobile was damaged
at Miller's car wash when butane escaped from a tank on the back of Crowe's pick-
up, causing an explosion. Crowe was negligent in leaving a discharge valve open on
the tank, and that act also violated rules and regulations of the Liquefied Petroleum
Gas Commission. Miller's employees were negligent in causing a hose to be torn loose.
In coming to the completely sane conclusion that both Miller and Crowe were liable,
the court found it necessary to resort to the following principles and authorities: (1)
Dixie held a safety statute's violation negligence per se, actionable if legal cause; (2)
Dixie defined "cause in fact" as "substantial factor", and defined "substantial factor"
as "but for"; (3) a 1933 Orleans appellate case held violation of a statute causal when
the effect couldn't have occurred had the statute been complied with; (4) American
Jurisprudence says intervention of another agency does not render violator of statute
a remote cause if the accident was the very thing the statute was aimed at; (5) Wiscon-
sin decision said liability flows from breaches of relevant statutes; (6) Home Gas &
Fuel Co. v. Mississippi Tank Co., 246 La. 625, 166 So. 2d 252 (1964) held rules of
Liquefield Petroleum Gas Commission like statutes, in that their violation is negli-
gence per se; (7) Corpus Juris Secundum says there can be more than one actionable
cause of an accident.
40. See Viator v. Gilbert, 206 So. 2d 106, 109 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1968), where
intoxicated defendant who blocked road and precipitated a four-car pile-up escaped
liability because not the proximate cause of the collision on the strength of a "rule"
that "[w]hen the lead vehicle makes a sudden stop, or one in order to execute an
illegal maneuver, but the operator of a second vehicle is able to bring his car to a stop
without a collision, the first driver is not liable if a third vehicle collides with the
second."
41. See Monger v. McFarlain, 204 So. 2d 86 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1967); Hartzog v.
Eubanks, 200 So. 2d 303 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1967); Surry v. Arkansas La. Gas Co., 170
So. 2d 133 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 247 La. 358, 171 So. 2d 477 (1965).
It is encouraging that cases heeding the Dixie admonition about the "passive
negligence" formulation do outnumber those ignoring it. See Dupre v. Darbonne, 266
So. 2d 553 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1972); Woods v. Employers Liab. Assur. Corp., 172 So.
2d 100 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1965); Champagne v. Southern Farm Bur. Cas. Ins. Co., 170
So. 2d 226 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1964); Vidrine v. General Fire and Cas. Co., 168 So. 2d
449 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1964); Landrum v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 151 So. 2d
701 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1963); Bertrand v. Trunkline Gas Co., 149 So. 2d 152 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1963); Larned v. Wallace, 146 So. 2d 434 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962), cert. denied,
January 25, 1963; Clingman v. Millerville Mud Sales, Inc., 146 So. 2d 240 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1962); Steagall v. Houston Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 138 So. 2d 433 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 1962).
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to employ the language of the Dixie formulation, but that they have
often wished to cling to other, partially inconsistent notions that
seem to provide more specific guidelines. Courts may say that "each
case must be decided on its own facts,"42 that "no rule . . . can be
laid down";" but rules have a powerful appeal to busy judges, and
apparently will be found or created whenever the psychological need
is strong enough.44
Still, the Dixie approach is clearer and more straightforwardly
policy-oriented than its predecessor; it has been influential; and even
a limited success is encouraging. On two levels, the Hill decision
represents a major step forward in a trend that may be said to have
begun with Dixie. First, on the technical level of operating the duty-
risk approach, it4" teaches that the following issues comprise the ap-
propriate range of inquiry in negligence cases (whether the duty alleg-
edly breached be a statutory provision or a case-law duty):"
(1) Was the conduct complained of a cause-in-fact of the
harm?47
42. See Picou v. Allstate Ins. Co., 206 So. 2d 99 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1968).
43. Id. See also Insurance Co. v. Tweed, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 44, 52 (1868), quoted
supra note 2.
44. For a mild example of a judicial tendency to make tests or rules out of ap-
proaches, statements of policy or general principle, see Speight v. Southern Farm
Bureau Insurance Co., 254 So. 2d 485, 489 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1971): "In Todd v. Aetna
Casualty & Surety Company, . . . we held that the test of whether recovery will be
allowed for mental anguish, fright, etc., resulting from unintentional torts, once caus-
tion in fact has been established, is whether defendant's duty to the plaintiff includes
protection against the consequences which actually occurred as determined by their
foreseeability tempered by judicial policy. We are of the opinion that that test is met
in the case at bar." See also the original hearing in Pierre v. Allstate Ins. Co., 221 So.
2d 846 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1969), rev'd, 257 La. 471, 242 So. 2d 821 (1971).
45. To be precise, the "teaching" in question stems from Dixie and Hill, but as
will be seen, there is useful corroboration and elaboration in several other recent
Louisiana supreme court determinations. See Matte v. Continental Trail., Inc., 278 So.
2d 60 (La. 1973); Brantley v. Brown, 277 So. 2d 141, 144 (La. 1973) (dissenting opin-
ion); Vonner v. State Dept. of Public Welfare, 273 So. 2d 252 (La. 1973); Weber v.
Phoenix Assur. Co., 273 So. 2d bO (La. 1973); Laird v. Travelers Ins. Co., 262 La. 199,
267 So. 2d 714 (1972); Welch v. Thomas, 262 La. 1132, 266 So. 2d 434, 435 (1972)
(dissenting opinion); Pierre v. Allstate Ins. Co., 257 La. 471, 242 So. 2d 821 (1971).
46. From one point of view, Dixie prescribed the duty-risk approach for cases
involving violation of statute, and Hill made clear that the approach is to be applied
to breaches of case-law duties, as well. See Hill v. Lundin & Assoc., Inc., 260 La. 542,
256 So. 2d 620 (1972).
47. Cause-in-fact is properly a straightforward factual inquiry, involving little or
no conscious resort to factors of policy or justice; the issue is simply whether defen-
dant's conduct was, in fact, a cause of plaintiffs harm. Some confusion has been
produced in this respect by the fact that the Dixie court used the term "substantial
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factor" as a synonym or test for causation in fact, and that term, as Professor Malone
pointed out. in Ruminations on Dixie Drive-It-Yourself Versus American Beverage
Company, 30 LA. L. REv. 363, 373 (1970) "might appear to suggest that the factor
should not be regarded as a cause-in-fact unless it is important policy-wise. This could
tend to reintroduce all the vagaries of proximate cause." Some of that confusion is
reflected in the cases cited in note 38 supra.
However, by and large, when the courts have confronted the issue of causation-
in-fact as such, they have handled it straightforwardly and sensibly, utilizing the
notion that plaintiff's burden on the issue is via a preponderance of the evidence, which
means that he needn't negate all other possible causes; that there can (indeed, will
always) be more than one operative cause of an accident, and that more than one cause
can be actionable; and that, therefore, it is incorrect to say that, because A caused it,
B didn't. See Vonner v. State Dept. of Pub. Wel., 273 So. 2d 252 (La. 1973); Ruthardt
v. Tennant, 252 La. 1041, 215 So. 2d 805 (1968); Home Gas & Fuel Co. v. Mississippi
Tank Co., 246 La. 625, 166 So. 2d 252 (1964); Naquin v. Marquette Cas. Co., 244 La.
569, 153 So. 2d 395 (1963); Perkins v. Texas & N.O. R.R., 243 La. 829, 147 So. 2d 646
(1962).
For a recent and noteworthy aberration, see Brantley v. Brown, 277 So. 2d 141 (La.
1973), where the majority, having reached a justifiable outcome and adduced sufficient
reasons for it, reached further for "causation" reasons and, in doing so, fomented
confusion. Issue: whether a twelve-year-old boy's negligence and violation of statute
in riding on a fender should bar his recovery against the driver of another car that
violated the host vehicle's right of way, causing the boy to be thrown from the fender
into the path of the other vehicle. Answer: no. Reason: "[T]he risk that such a statute
is designed to protect against does not encompass the risk of negligent driving ...
[Tihe duty .. .did not encompass the particular risk here encountered." 277 So. 2d
at 144. Unfortunately, the majority went further, adding as a reason: "[Yloung Bran-
tley's act of riding on the fender played no causative role in the accident. The accident
occurred solely because Mrs. Myles negligently violated the Brown vehicle's right of
way. . . .[Any negligence on the outrider's part does not causally contribute to such
an accident or to his injuries thereby resulting, for in the absence of the other driver's
negligence there would have been no accident and thus no injury at all .. " 277 So.
2d at 143. What that amounts to saying, it seems, is that because Mrs. Myles caused
the injuries, young Brantley didn't. The error is obvious: if young Brantley hadn't been
on the fender, the chances are he wouldn't have been hurt at all, and it is all but certain
that he wouldn't have been hurt as and how he was. That Mr. Justice Tate, author of
the Brantley opinion, was taking an uncharacteristic position on the issue of causation
in that case is indicated by his opinion in Vonner v. State Department of Public
Welfare, 273 So. 2d 252 (La. 1973). Holding the welfare department liable for the death
of a child beaten in a foster home, Justice Tate analyzed the causation issue thusly:
"To meet the burden of proof required in civil cases, the circumstantial evidence need
not negate all other possible causes, it need only prove the causal relationship to be
more probable than not. Further, the breach of duty need not be shown to be the sole
cause of the injuries; it is a cause in fact of the harm to another if it was a substantial
factor in bringing about or not preventing the harm that the duty was intended to
protect against." (Citations omitted.) 273 So. 2d at 255. (Emphasis added.) As a
dissenting opinion in Brantley evidences, the majority opinion there suffers, at the
least, from a case of over-persuasion.
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(2) Was the defendant under a legal duty imposed to protect
against the particular risk involved?"
(3) Taking into account the dangers created by defendant's
conduct, including but not limited to that which actually occurred
in the instant case-" 9 giving due but not automatically decisive
weight to any violation of relevant statute- 5 was the defendant's
conduct negligent, substandard, blameworthy?
(4) Was the plaintiff damaged; if so, to what extent?
It is on the second, deeper level of fundamental judicial philoso-
phy that the Dixie-Hill trend is most interesting (and that the jubila-
tion expressed by mentors Green and Malone at the decision in Hill
becomes fully understandable). The point can best be explicated by
reference to Pierre v. Allstate Insurance Co.,51 decided just over two
years prior to the Hill case, wherein a fairly typical traffic situation
ultimately provoked a philosophical break-through. Defendant's in-
sured had left his Chrysler unattended on a narrow road, partially
blocking traffic, and it was not difficult to conclude that in doing so
he was both negligent and in violation of relevant statutory provi-
sions. Plaintiffs' decedent was killed when a pickup truck in which
he was a passenger, forced by the Chrysler to stop for oncoming
traffic, was rear-ended by an inattentive dump truck. The pivotal
issue was whether defendant's duty embraced the risk that killed
decedent. Prior to ultimate disposition in the supreme court, the
following resolutions were proposed:
(1) The trial court held that the sole proximate cause of the acci-
dent was the negligence of the dump truck driver; that the Chrysler
driver's negligence was too remote to be actionable.
(2) On original hearing, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal said
they thought the trial judge was right, but that they were compelled
48. Hill v. Lundin & Assoc. Inc., 260 La. 542, 256 So. 2d 620 (1972).
49. See Laird v. Travelers Ins. Co., 263 La. 199, 267 So. 2d 714 (1972).
50. See Smolinski v. Taulli, 276 So. 2d 286, 289 (La. 1973): "While statutory
violations are not in and of themselves definitive of civil liability, they may be guide-
lines for the court in determining standards of negligence by which civil liability is
determined"; Weber v. Phoenix Assur. Co., 273 So. 2d 30, 33 (La. 1973): "We have
rejected the concept that a violation of a penal statute automatically constitutes negli-
gence, and we have rejected the terminology 'negligence per se'." Laird v. Travelers
Ins. Co., 263 La. 199, 208, 267 So. 2d 714, 717 (1972): "'Criminal statutesare not, in
and of themselves, definitive of civil liability' and do not set the rule for civil liability;
but they may be guidelines for the court in fixing civil liability." Some of the courts
of appeal are apparently still unaware that the negligence per se language and ap-
proach have been repudiated, see discussion at note 63 infra.
51. 257 La. 471, 242 So. 2d 821 (1971).
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by Dixie's rejection of the "passive negligence" concept in just such
situations to a contrary result.
5
1
(3) On rehearing, the court of appeal changed its mind, distinguish-
ing Dixie on the facts: here, the parked vehicle was not actually hit,
and the pickup had been stopped for several moments before the
dump truck hit it.
(4) The supreme court on original hearing agreed fundamentally
with the reasoning and conclusion of the court of appeal.
On rehearing, the supreme court reversed. Justice Barham's
opinion demonstrated that causation-in-fact was clear; that the stat-
ute violated by defendant's insured was designed with just this kind
of risk in mind; and that the really difficult issue in the case was
presented by the fact that the negligence of the dump-truck driver
was also a cause-in-fact of the accident. 53 On that issue, the following
language is crucial:
The keys for the solution of the issue of responsibility when
there is more than one cause-in-fact of damages are (1) a determi-
nation of the exact risk or risks anticipated by imposition of the
legal duty which has been breached and (2) the legal or policy,
considerations which grant excuses from certain consequences
which follow an act of negligence. This requires, under the facts
and the law of each case and the attendant exigencies, a jurispru-
dential determination which will implement and make effective
our broad codal provisions concerning those who should respond
in damages for their fault.54 (Emphasis added.)
52. Pierre v. Allstate Ins. Co., 221 So. 2d 846 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1969). The original
disposition by the court of appeal in Pierre is yet another demonstration of an under-
standable but regrettable tendency to make rules out of decisions that promulgated
only approach and technique. See Malone, Ruminations on Dixie Drive-It-Yourself
Versus American Beverage Company, 30 LA. L. REv. 363, 369 n.22 (1970): "On one
occasion the Court of Appeal for the Fourth Circuit felt itself so constrained by its
interpretation of Dixie as an arbitrary rule that it felt obliged to distinguish the case.
Pierre .... " See also note 44 supra.
53. Plaintiffs had settled with the owner and driver of the dump truck and its
insurer, and with the driver of the pick-up, his employer, and its insurer.
54. 242 So. 2d at 831. The italicized language clearly admonishes attention to each
case on its own facts. In its invocation of "broad codal provisions" in support of that
sensible approach, it foreshadows an increasingly prevalent theme in Louisiana juris-
prudence. More recently, one of the courts of appeal sounded much the same theme,
intimating that "proximate cause" jumbles may be in origin children either of the devil
or the common law. Winzer v. Lewis, 251 So. 2d 650, 655 (La. App. 2d Cir. ), cert.
denied, 259 La. 934, 253 So. 2d 379 (1971). After stressing that article 2315, rather than
the particular traffic statute violated, was the key to the case, the court said: "We
think it fair to say that in most instances, when [2315's] meaning has become obscure
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Under that approach the court concluded, not without difficulty, that
the statutory prohibitions in the case were designed to avoid collision
with confused or inattentive drivers as well as prudent drivers, who
hit another vehicle as well as the offending vehicle.
At the technical level, the Pierre court well utilized the duty-risk
approach later and more clearly promulgated in Hill. At the deeper
level of jurisprudential philosophy, the italicized language from
Pierre is crucial. What the case amounts to is a clear and almost fully
explicit admonition that rules are not magic;55 that each case must
be approached, within a fabric of principle and doctrine," on its own
facts.57 It seems evident that the Supreme Court of Louisiana has
been trending rather strongly in recent years toward a fairly consis-
tent position that the Louisiana tort law should seek to avoid the
proliferation of doctrines of a narrow and rigid thrust," in favor of
or complicated, it was because our courts have resorted to highly theoretical doctrines
foreign to our civil law system. The word 'causes' has come in for its share of interpreta-
tions. In searching the jurisprudence we find such classifications as 'proximate cause,'
'intervening cause,' 'cause-in-fact' and other terms too numerous to mention." In a
slightly different context, Professor Malone described the concept of "cause" as a
"child of the street [who] simply will not behave." Malone, Ruminations on Cause-
In-Fact, 9 STAN. L. REv. 60, 61 (1956).
55. For another perspective on this same theme, see Robertson, The Precedent
Value of Conclusions of Fact in Civil Cases in England and Louisiana, 29 LA. L. REV.
78 (1968).
56. It is highly significant that even the most extreme American legal realist
position is premised on precisely the assumption that standards and principles
whereby decisions can be reached, understood, and criticized exist and can be ascer-
tained. See J. FRANK, LAW & THE MODERN MIND 137 (1930): "All judges exercise
discretion, individualize abstract rules, make law. Shall the process be concealed or
disclosed? The fact is, and every lawyer knows it, that those judges who are most
lawless, or most swayed by the 'perverting influences of their emotional natures,' or
most dishonest, are often the very judges who use most meticulously the language of
compelling mechanical logic, who elaborately wrap about themselves the pretense of
merely discovering and carrying out existing rules, who sedulously avoid any indica-
tions that they individualize cases. If every judicial opinion contained a clear exposi-
tion of all the actual grounds of the decision, the tyrants, the bigots and the dishonest
men on the bench would lose their disguises and become known for what they are."
57. The "fabric of principle and doctrine" that constitutes the law of negligence
is not notably nebulous, compared to the necessary referent in many areas of constitu-
tional law. See, e.g., the frequent, necessary appeal to "juridical tradition" in Justice
Frankfurter's powerful opinion in Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952). Now that,
by itself, is a vague standard indeed, yet can anyone reading the Rochin opinion doubt
that there is a juridical tradition which spoke with some clarity to the issue being
considered in that case?
58. See Gilmore, Legal Realism: Its Cause and Cure, 70 YALE L.J. 1037 (1961);
Robertson, The Precedent Value of Conclusions of Fact in Civil Cases in England and
Louisiana, 29 LA. L. REv. 78 (1968).
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more straightforward, conscious, and fact-oriented resort to the un-
derlying principles of the Louisiana Civil Code.5" In the past eleven
years, the court has: (1) disapproved the concept of "passive negli-
gence" as a key to decision in multiple-cause situations; 0 (2) strongly
admonished the lower courts against the notion that "foreseeability"
is magic;' (3) sought to take some of the "automaticness" out of the
contributory negligence doctrine;62 (4) disapproved the concept and
the term "negligence per se";13 (5) buried the anciently troublesome
59. A major break-through, with the forecast of more to come, has been achieved
in the utilization of the Civil Code to construct a sensible, policy-oriented body of law
for ultrahazardous activities. See Langlois v. Allied Chem. Corp., 258 La. 1067, 249
So. 2d 133 (1971) (breakthrough); Theriot v. Transit Cas. Co., 263 La. 106, 267 So. 2d
211 (1972) (forecast); Boudreaux v. American Ins. Co., 262 La. 721, 264 So. 2d 621
(1972) (forecast).
60. Dixie Drive-It-Yourself Sys. v. American Bev. Co., 242 La. 471, 137 So. 2d 298
(1962).
61. Hill v. Lundin & Assoc., Inc., 260 La. 542, 256 So. 2d 620 (1972).
62. Laird v. Travelers Ins. Co., 263 La. 199, 267 So. 2d 714 (1972), where, in the
very first sentence of the opinion, the court indicated its full consciousness that the
jurisprudential movement being discussed was the key to the case: "The posture of the
case before us, the facts, and the legal issues presented would appear to be acceptable
with unanimity to the courts below and this court. However, the method of resolution
of the issues as well as the result to be obtained in that resolution has provoked
disparity of view." 263 La. at 202, 267 So. 2d 715. (Emphasis added.)
63. See note 51 supra, for the supreme court decisions stating and iterating this
principle. It seems rather straightforward, yet some of the courts of appeal seem deter-
mined to cling to the disapproved terminology. See Augustine v. Dugas, 278 So. 2d 907,
909 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1973): "We find this accident was caused solely and proximately
by the negligence of the plaintiff in attempting to cross Canal Street outside a cross-
walk and not at an intersection. Such action is in violation of LSA-R.S. 32:213 ....
This action of plaintiff is what the statute. . . was designed to prevent. This violation
of the provisions thereof is negligence per se which will, in this case, preclude recovery
by plaintiff." Plaisance v. Smith, 278 So. 2d 155, 159 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1973): "Under
the authority of [Dixie] we find Mr. Plaisance was guilty of negligence per se in
walking on Louisiana Streets in violation of LSA-R.S. 32:216 (B) .... ." Poret v.
Spencer, 277 So. 2d 689, 691 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1973): "Plaintiffs first contention is
that Mrs. Spencer was negligent per se for failing to stop for the school bus in violation
of LSA-R.S. 32:80 . . . . We find this statute inapplicable .... " Mistretta v. Fior-
ella, 269 So. 2d 589 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1972): "Plaintiff claimed to have proved the
owner's failure to comply with a New Orleans ordinance, constituting per se negligence
." The court went on to impose liability on the basis of the conclusion that
violation of the ordinance was a "legal cause" of the fire loss.
I am not contending that any of the cited decisions was wrongly decided. The
contention is rather that the courts in three of the four used the discredited negligence
per se formula in a way that obviated the required inquiry into the question of the sub-
standardness of the actor's conduct. It does seem highly surprising that in none of the
cases did the court of appeal seem aware of the supreme court's action abolishing the
negligence per se approach and terminology.
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"assured clear distance" rule; 4 (6) sternly rejected the idea that entry
into smoke or fog on the highway is contributory negligence as a
matter of law;" (7) to a considerable degree demystified res ipsa
loquitur;"6 (8) in the field of intentional torts, thrown out the famous
old "aggressor doctrine." 7
It would not be amiss to suggest that an orderly revolution is in
progress. All the doctrines in question suffered principally from
undue rigidity of application, and all are proving expendable in the
interest of a more forthright interjection of informed human judg-
ment into the tort process. There is nothing new or unAmerican about
this. No modern torts lawyer should forget the spectacle of O.W.
Holmes, Jr., history's "straw man" on the very issue under discus-
sion. In 1881 he wrote that negligence law should continually become
more specific and detailed, so that there would be fewer and fewer
and narrower and narrower determinations that had to be left to
juries, and more and more that the law had "settled," had "fixed.""8
In 1927 he decided that, as a matter of law, it was negligent of any
motorist at a grade crossing not to stop, look, listen, and in frequent
cases reconnoiter;" and in 1934 the entire matter had to be straight-
ened out by Mr. Justice Cardozo, who delivered a gentle but firm
coup de grace to Mr. Justice Holmes' rule.70 Pointing out that the rule
in question (quite typically of formulations too narrow and rigid in
scope) was in origin an "unnecessary . . .remark";7 labelling it "a
fertile source of controversy";" citing the need to "clear the ground
of brushwood"; 3 ruefully surveying the "thickets of conflicting judg-
ments,"74 the "diversities of doctrine"75 it had spawned, Mr. Justice
Cardozo said the rule had to be dispatched.
It is likely that the supreme court's determination that the negligence per se
approach and terminology be abandoned was influenced by the fact that in Louisiana,
statutes and ordinances, particularly relating to traffic, literally proliferate. See, e.g.,
Grisby v. Coastal Mar. Serv., 235 F. Supp. 97 (W.D. La. 1964).
64. Craker v. Allstate Ins. Co., 259 La. 578, 250 So. 2d 746 (1971).
65. Campbell v. American Home Assur. Co., 260 La. 1047, 258 So. 2d 81 (1972).
66. Boudreaux v. American Ins. Co., 262 La. 721, 264 So. 2d 621 (1972).
67. Morneau v. American Oil Co., 272 So. 2d 313 (La. 1973).
68. 0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW, 88-103 (1881).
69. Baltimore & 0. R.R. v. Goodman, 275 U.S. 66 (1927).
70. Pokora v. Wabash Ry., 292 U.S. 98 (1934).
71. Id. at 102.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 103.
75. Id. at 104.
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Illustrations such as these bear witness to the need for caution in
framing standards of behavior that amount to rules of law. The
need is the more urgent when there is no background of experi-
ence out of which the standards have emerged. They are then, not
the natural flowerings of behavior in its customary forms, but
rules artificially developed, and imposed from without."6
In Louisiana, a "natural flowering" seems to be in progress. At
least in the torts field, there seems to be emerging a new judicial
philosophy, cast in the form of a modern civilianism determined to
see the Civil Code through the eyes of the present. Exhibiting no
particular regard for the ersatz respectability of antiquarian veneer
that Code study seems sometimes to represent," this new civilianism
rightly views the Code as a fabric of juridical principle within which
concerned, candid, and informed judges can and must perform their
very human function. The analytical technique provided by the court
in the Hill case is an important event in the emergence of this new
judicial philosophy. Attention to its specific thrust and detail and,
more importantly, to the underlying philosophical tradition it repre-
sents can appreciably aid an orderly transition into a truly principle-
oriented Louisiana tort system. Viewed in that light, the Hill case is
indeed a happy event; Professors Green and Malone may continue to
applaud, as immoderately as they choose, and I hereby join them.
76. Id. at 105.
77. It ought to be obvious that I certainly don't intend to imply any want of
scholarship. To the contrary, see, e.g., Langlois v. Allied Chem. Corp., 258 La. 1067,
249 So. 2d 133 (1971). For a thoughtful appraisal, see The Work of the Louisiana
Appellate Courts for the 1971-72 Term-Property, 33 LA. L. REV. 172, 179-86 (1973).
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